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Abstract 
We revisit the financial-economic growth nexus, accounting for differential effects of 
large scale legislative frameworks, such as political and financial integration, in 
Europe. Debt is introduced as an integral component, and potential trifold endogeneity 
is investigated. Empirical findings show that neither political, nor financial integration, 
appear to have a direct impact on economic growth. In contrast, only monetary 
integration has a “dual” “indirect” impact on economic growth. First, the euro allows 
for improved access to financing, which enhances economic growth. This increases 
market values, which further accelerate economic growth. This is only evident within 
Eurozone, highlighting a “euro effect”, whereas political integration seems to be 
insufficient in engaging the countries in a synergetic endogeneity. Second, the 
improved access to financing induced by the euro introduces an additional 
macroeconomic risk of “over-borrowing”. This reverses the abovementioned spiral 
link by decreasing market values and therefore, lead the economies to spiral 
contraction. Consequently, the suitability of adopting euro should depend on the ability 
of each country to balance its dual role, under sustainable financing.  
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I. Introduction 
This study investigates the aptness of differential levels of integration in Europe, i.e., political and 
monetary, by focusing on its impact on the relationship between financial growth and economic 
growth, as well as public borrowing levels. Early literature (Schumpeter, 1911) recognizes that 
“open market” economies seem to be associated with higher economic growth, raising the question 
of whether and how financial growth is associated with economic growth. Several studies (e.g., 
Diaz-Alejandro, 1985; Fry, 1978) suggest that a deeper financial system is a pre-condition for 
economic growth because it reduces transactions costs and accelerates trading, while others (e.g., 
Robinson, 1952, 1979; Miller, 1998) purport that economic growth requires more intense trading 
and thus, a deeper financial system. Another branch of literature (e.g., Levine, 1996, 1997) 
recognize that financial growth and economic growth might interact and thus, potential 
endogeneity issues might render it difficult to establish direct causal relationships (Collins, 2007), 
thus they implicitly highlight the empirical nature of the relationship. 
The underlying theoretical argument that links financial with economic growth is that markets 
influence the allocation of resources and information cross-sectionally and over time (Merton and 
Bodie, 1995). They can achieve that by improving information dissemination (Bagehot, 1873; 
Boyd and Prescott, 1986), mobilization of capital and resources (e.g., Sirri and Tufano, 1995), 
corporate governance (Myers and Majluf, 1984) and thus, reducing risk (e.g., Gurley and Shaw, 
1955; Patrick, 1966). A necessary condition for markets to achieve this is some form of integration 
that allows an uninterrupted flow of capital, resources and information. Kose et al. (2009) argue 
that liberalization and financial integration appear to have an positive, but indirect effect on 
economic growth, especially for countries with low level of financial integration and financial 
deepening, while co-existence of financial integration and liberalization amplify their (Alfaro et 
al, 2004; Durham, 2004) impact. 
However, not all studies come to a consensus with regards to the positive impact of financial 
growth on economic growth. According to several economists (e.g., Bhagwati, 1998; Stiglitz, 
2002) an increasing capital account liberalization and unfettered capital flows pose a direct 
“instability” thread to economies, due to their exposure to macroeconomic shocks; a risk that they 
believe overcomes the benefits of liberalization. Relevant literature recognizes three major sources 
of induced risk. The first refers to “over-reliance” on market efficiency, which might lead to 
“excessive optimism” and thus, to the creation of asset bubbles (e.g., Gibson et al. 2013). The 
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second. The second refers to market openness (e.g., Alessi and Detken, 2011, Popov, 2011), which 
might create the conditions for premature growth and thus over exposure to macroeconomic 
shocks. Along the same lines, the third source of risk is identified into the funding sources of 
economic growth, where a better access to capital markets might lead to excessive borrowing.  
Kose et al. (2009) purport that liberalization and financial integration appear to have a positive but 
indirect effect on economic growth, in spite of the potential induction of instability due to 
unfettered capital flows and thus, further integration does not always create growth. A minimum 
level of financial deepening is required beforehand. This implicitly recognizes that the optimal 
level and timing of integration depends on the existing relationship between financial growth and 
economic growth and that higher integration does not unconditionally accelerate growth. This is 
the primary objective of this study, which aims at investigating the impact of various levels of 
integration by focusing on the financial-economic growth nexus. 
This is particularly relevant to Europe which has promoted financial, alongside political integration 
as the defining pillars of the, so called, “development model” (e.g., Friedrich et al., 2012). This 
approach has been mostly unquestionable (e.g., Edwards, 1998) until the sovereign bond crisis in 
2009, when several countries experienced double digit slow down. This has been attributed to prior 
excessive optimism (Friedrich et al., 2012), excessive borrowing levels (De Grauwe and Ji, 2013) 
and intense contagion effects and spillovers (e.g., Beetsma et al., 2013). Friedrich et al., (2012) 
highlight the importance of political integration in accelerating growth, but fail to address how it 
affects the financial-economic growth nexus. 
This paper seeks to investigate the aptness of differential levels of integration in Europe by 
focusing on how they affect financial growth and economic growth. First, we differentiate between 
financial and political integration in an aggregated level and examine their direct and indirect 
impact on financial growth and economic growth. We recognize that financial growth and 
economic growth might evolve endogenously and thus, we model explicitly structural 
endogeneity. Finally, in order to account for over-capitalization of expectations due to differential 
levels of integration (Friedrich et al., 2012) we introduce public borrowing levels as an integral 
part of relationship between financial growth and economic growth. 
Our empirical analysis, on a sample of 27 European countries over a period from 1998 to 2012, 
highlights a dual effect of euro. First, it is found to have a direct positive impact only on financial 
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growth. Markets appear to capitalize stability expectations into enhanced market values and this 
has a significant spiral boosting effect on economic growth, even when debt is high. This link is 
not fully observed upon political integration alone and it is absent in non-member states. Second, 
the euro allows for increased borrowing, which under specific circumstances can enhance 
economic growth. However, the increased financing has a negative impact on market values and 
thus, it reverses the previous spiral link, suppressing growth. This is more evident during bull 
market periods. Consequently, the suitability of adopting the euro depends on the borrowing 
capacity of each country and its ability to benefit from financial growth in the long term.  
II. Literature Review 
A. Financial Growth and Economic Growth 
Early literature (Schumpeter, 1911) reports positive correlation between financial growth and 
economic growth. “Open market” economies aim at reducing intermediary costs, in order to assist 
economic development, while centralized economies appear to experience slower growth.1 Four 
major hypotheses have been developed to describe the link between the two figures (Kose et al., 
2009). The supply-leading hypothesis (e.g. Diaz-Alejandro, 1985; Fry, 1978; McKinnon, 1973; 
Moore, 1986; Shaw, 1973) purports that a sustainably deepening financial system can lead to 
increased economic growth. In contrast, the demand-following hypothesis (e.g. Darrat, 1999; 
Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Ireland, 1994; Patrick, 1966) suggests that increased demand 
requires more intensive trading and a deeper financial system; financial growth should follow 
economic growth spikes. More comprehensive approaches (e.g. Berthelemy and Varoudakis, 
1996; Blackburn and Hung, 1998; Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Greenwood and Jovanovic, 
1990; Greenwood and Smith, 1997; Harrison et al. 1999; Saint-Paul, 1992) suggest a bi-directional 
relationship, arguing that economic growth requires financial deepening, which in turn further 
enhances economic growth. Finally, several studies (e.g. Lucas, 1988; Stern, 1989) argue that 
financial deepening only occasionally has a short-term impact on economic growth.2  
                                                          
1 Watchel (2003) highlights that the absence of financial growth, especially before 1990 has had significant negative 
impact on economic growth, especially for economies that experience state intervention.  
2 Recent empirical literature (e.g. Manning, 2003; Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011) confirms that the impact of financial 
growth on economic development has weakened considerably after 1990. 
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The theoretical base for discussing the impact of financial on economic growth focuses on 
ameliorating market frictions (Merton and Bodie, 1995). An important function of markets towards 
this direction is the dissemination of information and a more efficient allocation of resources. 
Deeper and more liquid markets should make it easier, compared to individual investors, to collect 
information (Begehot, 1873), either through intermediary institutions (e.g., Ramakrishnan and 
Thakor, 1984; Allen, 1990; Bhattacharya and Pleiderer, 1985) or because firms would have the 
incentive to do so in order to limit exploitable private information (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz, 
1980; Kyle, 1984; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993). This undeniably could improve resource 
allocation (Boyd and Prescott, 1986). Furthermore, since an enhanced capital flow would improve 
firms’ access to capital, the equity capital structure is also expected to change, along with the way 
information about managerial decisions is disseminated (Berle and Means, 1932). Larger 
shareholders exhibit better means in acquiring this information (Grossman and Hart, 1980, 1986; 
Stulz, 1988) and an improved corporate governance can better engage with innovation and growth 
activities. In parallel, an improved access to the market can contribute to reducing individual firms’ 
cost of capital by enhancing cross-sectional (e.g., Gurley and Shaw, 1955; Patrick, 1966; 
Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; Devereux and Smith, 1994) and time (e.g., Allen and Gale, 
1997) diversification, as well as by reducing liquidity induced costs (e.g., Hicks, 1969; Diamond 
and Dybvig, 1983; Levine, 1991). Finally, another function which allows financial deepening to 
have an impact on economic growth is the improvement of savings’ mobilization (e.g., Boyd and 
Smith, 1992; Lamoreaux, 1994) and facilitation of exchange (e.g., Williamson and Wright, 1994), 
which are a costly processes for individuals 
These factors are usually latent and there are several empirical proxies in the literature to measure 
one or multiple dimensions of financial deepening, such as the size of financial intermediaries 
(Goldsmith, 1969), the size of the private institutions with respect to GDP and credit allocation 
(King and Levine, 1993), as well as the level of government ownership in the banking system (La 
Porta et al., 2002). The use of various proxies results in conflicting results and highlights that the 
link between financial growth and economic growth is empirical in nature and that, among other 
things, the link depends on how individual variables are measured. Furthermore, empirical findings 
are also affected by the models employed to account for the dynamic character of the relationship 
between financial growth and economic growth. The first studies (e.g., Goldsmith, 1969; King and 
Levine, 1993) employ cross-sectional samples, which although they address various dimensions 
of the relationship, they generally ignore causality and temporal dependence (Shan et al, 2001). 
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Therefore, several studies employ panel data samples and dynamic panel data techniques (e.g., 
Levine 1991, 1997) in order to extract any endogenous component and focus only on the direct 
impact. However, reverse causality and potential endogeneity are not explicitly accounted for. 
Towards this direction, some studies employ Vector Error Correction Models (VECM) in order to 
account for the temporal dependence (e.g., Ang and McKibbin, 2007), but they also ignore any 
structural causality.  
B. Financial Growth and Macroeconomic Risk 
However, not all studies support that financial growth is beneficial. A significant part of the 
literature reports a rather negative impact of financial growth on stability. Stiglitz (2000), 
challenging the idea of business-cycle volatility (Lucas, 1987), argues that excessive optimism, 
enhanced by more advanced financial systems, dramatically increases the probability of “asset 
bubble” creation and, consequently, the frequency of macroeconomic shocks (Gibson et al., 2013). 
More specifically, a deeper financial system can indeed improve mobilization of resources, 
information dissemination, corporate governance and reduce risk, but all these under the 
assumption that the markets operate efficiently. In contrast, a deeper inter connected structure that 
is not efficient could potentially create the unfounded expectations, due to the fact that participants 
expect them to be efficient, which could contribute to irrational capitalization of expectations 
(Friedrich et al., 2012). In case the countries are connected, contagion effects might become very 
significant (Beetsma et al., 2013). Unless efficient regulatory practices are in place (Popov and 
Smets, 2011), countries are exposed to a magnified impact on economic growth. Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1999) provide empirical evidence of greater exposure to financial crises after a period 
of high growth, especially for countries that exhibit a parallel growth in their financial systems. 
Literature recognizes two sources of risk. First, market openness (e.g. Alessi and Detken, 2011; 
Popov, 2011; Popov and Smets, 2011) is identified as one of the main sources of the trade-off 
between the contribution of financial to economic growth, and macroeconomic risk. Financial 
growth is seen as a funding and supporting mechanism for economic growth. However, this comes 
at the price of making the economy more susceptible to immaturely generated growth and to 
external shocks, both resulting from a greater contribution of individual bank risk to systemic risk. 
Kindleberger (1978), Minsky (1986) and Popov and Smets (2011) distinguish between “good” and 
“bad” growth. Second, another source of increased macroeconomic risk is the accumulation of 
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public debt in periods of growth, probably due to irrational optimism (Heinemann et al., 2013). 
Early literature  recognises this negative impact in the form of reduced income or slower 
investment flows(e.g. Buchanan, 1958; Meade, 1958; Modigliani, 1961) or in the form of tighter 
fiscal and tax policies applied during a post-borrowing period in an effort to improve credibility 
(e.g. Adam and Bevan, 2005; Aizenman et al., 2007; Diamond, 1965; Saint-Paul, 1992). A non-
linear relationship between public debt and economic growth has also been reported (e.g. 
Aschauer, 2000; Checherita and Rother, 2010; Clements et al., 2003; Krugman, 1988).3  
C. Political and Monetary Integration  
Heinemann et al. (2013) suggest that political and financial integrations might explain the dual 
effect of financial growth on economic growth and its non-linearity with debt. They argue that 
political and especially monetary integration can enhance not only the benefits of financial growth 
(e.g. Edwards, 1998), but also the contaminating effects of external macroeconomic shocks (e.g. 
Berglof et al., 2009), as well as that external financing might be beneficial to industries that depend 
on external funding. In contrast, empirical literature appears to be inconclusive reporting a rather 
moderate (Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2006, 2007; Kose et al., 2009) or long term (Kaminsky and 
Schmukler, 2008) positive impact of integration, or a slower growth for countries that depend on 
borrowing rather than on savings (Prasad et al., 2007).  
Elaborating on this, Kose et al., (2009) argue that financial integration plays an important role on 
how the relationship between financial growth and economic growth is shaped. The fundamental 
principle for financial deepening is that it ameliorates resource allocation by limiting market 
frictions. A necessary condition to achieve this, is the unrestricted flow of these resources, which 
requires some form of integration. A more liberal market should allow capital to move, with less 
restrictions, to investments in developing economies, which are expected to yield higher returns. 
In parallel, a deeper and more mature financial system should also reduce relevant risks involved 
and therefore should easier attract capital. Consequently, Kose et al. (2009) observe that both 
financial deepening and financial integration should have a positive effect on economic growth 
                                                          
3 These studies argue that public debt increases consumption power and up to a level (e.g. below 40%, Pattillo et al., 
2002) may boost economic growth. However, beyond certain thresholds (e.g. beyond 90%, Clements et al. 2003; 
Kumar and Woo, 2010) the impact on credibility is disproportional, and thus a negative relationship is observed. 
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(e.g., Frankel and Romer, 1999; Dollar and Kraay, 2003; Berg and Krueger, 2003), but the impact 
of integration should be expected to be rather indirect.  
Contrary to this, indirect, positive effect, many studies (e.g., Rodrik, 1998; Bhagwati, 1998; 
Stiglitz, 2002) suggest that the current account opening and the unfettered flows of capital expose 
countries to marcroeconomic shocks and external spillover effects. Sudden loss of confidence 
could result in sudden stops of capital flows, with profoundly negative effects on economic growth. 
The various currency crises in the 1980’s and 1990’s have shown that countries with more liberal 
approaches have been more susceptible to sudden stops (e.g, Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; 
Edwards, 20005), especially when these are combined with low financial deepening and high 
public levels of debt. Indeed, the accumulation of public debt has been identified as a major source 
of exposure to external shocks. Eichengreen et al. (2006) argue that the only meaningful form of 
international capital flows is in the form of debt, which does not share the positive attributes of 
equity-like flows and thus, they might induce inefficient capital allocation (Wei, 2006) and 
increase financial instability (Berg et al. 2004). Introducing capital controls, would not reduce risk 
exposure because it would decrease liquidity in the banking system (Diamond and Rajan, 2001) 
and deprive the country from the necessary conditions for longer term macroeconomic growth 
(Jeanne, 2003).  
Kose et al. (2009) argue that the development of financial integration could, in principle, benefit 
countries with lower levels of integration, but the cost-benefit analysis for more advanced 
economies is not straightforward, because it depends on potential endogeneity and threshold 
effects. They particularly stress out that due to the impact of potentially strong endogeneity, 
financial integration might not be the key to economic growth. This argument is supported by 
unique country studies, such as India and China (Prasad et al., 2003), which report that financial 
integration is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for economic growth (Ariyoshi et al., 
2000; Bakker and Chapple, 2002). Kose et al. (2009) conclude that a more relevant question to 
pose is the suitability of the magnitude and timing of integration, since its impact on economic 
growth is not unconditional.  
Recent studies support this view and provide evidence that financial integration could indeed under 
some conditions contribute to economic growth. In more detail, financial sector development 
appears to amplify the benefits of financial integration (Alfaro et al, 2004; Durham, 2004) and that 
a minimum level of financial deepening is a prerequisite (Hermes and Lensik, 2003). These 
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benefits might include greater diversification and thus, might lead to greater macroeconomic 
stability (Easterly et al., 2001; Denizer et al., 2002; Larrain, 2004; Beck et al., 2006), as well as a 
mitigation of the adverse growth effects of financial crises by shortening the expansion and 
contraction cycles (Calvo and Talvi, 2005; Kose et al., 2004). However, in order for these benefits 
to be realised, a greater level of integration than financial only (Eichengreen 2001) is required. 
This empirical evidence highlight the importance of the causality due to potential endogeneity. 
This is particularly relevant in the context of European monetary integration and current financial 
instability. European policies have promoted the open market approach, pursuing higher levels of 
political, financial and trade integration, aspiring to improve government access to borrowing and 
thus, to higher economic growth. Indeed, during the mid-1990’s period externally financed 
economic growth was realised, but this credit boom is believed to have made the region more 
vulnerable to external macroeconomic shocks (Berglof et al., 2009). Thereafter, both market 
openness and excessive borrowing have been criticised in the literature as risk inducing factors. 
More specifically, Heinemann et al. (2014) argue that optimism has increased confidence in the 
sovereign bond market, which decreased borrowing costs, especially for economies in transition. 
In contrast, De Grauwe (2011, 2012) and De Grauwe and Ji (2013) provide evidence that this 
confidence has elevated fragility, due to increased borrowing levels and contagion, to the extent 
that a sovereign debt crisis was inevitable, since governments have no power on money supply. 
Beirne and Fratzscher (2012) report that increased contagion and herding contagion during the 
financial crisis has caused a sharp “re”-focus of financial markets on fundamentals, which 
dissolved the earlier beneficial impact of optimism. In parallel, several studies (Mink and De Haan, 
2012; Missio and Watzka, 2011) show that EU countries experience increased contagion effects, 
especially when “tangible bad” news hit the market, even if a country’s fundamentals do not 
change dramatically (Gibson et al., 2013). Consequently, these studies recognize that integration 
intensifies the market reaction in both tails of the distribution, but they do not distinguish between 
the marginal impact of political versus financial integration.  
III. Methodology 
A. Model 
In order to study the relationship between economic growth and the other two, potentially 
endogenous growth determinants, namely financial growth and government borrowing, the 
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starting point of the empirical approach suggested here is the neo-classical growth model (e.g., 
Mankiw, 1992, 1995). Growth; of country 𝑖 at year 𝑡, is defined as the % difference of the logged 
GDP, i.e. 𝐺𝑖,𝑡 = (
𝛥[𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡]
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
⁄ ), which implies that given a convergence parameter, 𝜆 >
0, 𝐺𝑖,𝑡 = −𝜆(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑦 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒). Assuming that countries are not likely to be at their 
steady states, transitional dynamics should have a significant impact on growth. Literature (e.g., 
Christopoulos and Tsionas, 2004) approximates the long-run steady state of GDP with a linear 
function of structural parameters, i.e., 𝑓(∙), which produces a testable equation of the following 
form 
𝐺𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝒂
′𝑓(𝑋𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑠, 𝑋𝐸𝑥𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑠) + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡  →  𝑣𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
where, 𝒂′ is a vector of linear parameters, to be estimated, 𝜂𝑖 is an unobservable country effect, 
capturing also the initial GDP state, 𝜆𝑡 is a time dymmy that captures time unobservable effects 
and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  is a pure idiosyncratic error term. Literature (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and 
Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) suggests estimating the linear parameters of equation 1 
using a dynamic panel difference (Arellano and Bond, 1991) or system (Arellano and Bover, 1995; 
Alonso-Borego and Arellano, 1996; Blundell and Bond, 1998) GMM technique. The objective of 
this approach is to extract the endogenous component of the regressors and, thus investigate their 
“pure” impact on economic growth, while the dynamic characteristics of the data are taken into 
consideration in the moment conditions, imposing that the error term (in the levels and in the first 
difference) is not autocorrelated and not correlated with the regressors. However, their approach 
does not address causality among the endogenous regressors, which might introduce 
multicollinearity issues (Mankiw et a., 1995; Leon-Gonzalez and Montolio; 2015). 
This is a primary objective of the current study, which aims at investigating the differential impact 
of political and monetary integration, by addressing the structural causality among two endogenous 
regressors, namely financial, i.e., 𝐹𝐺 = (
𝛥[𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑡]
𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑡−1
⁄ ), measured as the % change in 
market capitalization , and debt, i.e., 𝐷𝐸𝐵 = (
𝛥[𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡]
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡−1
⁄ ), measured by the % change in 
the level of public debt, growth. In line with Christopoulos and Tsionas (2004), the structural 
causality is modelled by introducing two additional equations that define the long-run, equilibrium 
relations of 𝐹𝐺 = 𝛽0 + 𝜷
′𝑔(𝑋𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑠, 𝑋𝐸𝑥𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑠) + 𝜂𝐹𝐺;𝑖 + 𝜆𝐹𝐺;𝑡 + 𝜀𝐹𝐺;𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐷𝐸𝐵 = 𝛾0 +
𝜸′𝑧(𝑋𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑠, 𝑋𝐸𝑥𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑠) + 𝜂𝐷𝐸𝐵,𝑖 + 𝜆𝐷𝐸𝐵,𝑡 + 𝜀𝐷𝐸𝐵,𝑖,𝑡 , explicitly as stochastic endogenous 
variables, where 𝑔(∙) and 𝑧(∙) are linear approximations of the conditional mean of financial and 
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debt growth. Economic growth is explicitly allowed to affect the level of both. This creates a 
system of testable equations which can be summarized below:  
𝐺𝑖,𝑡 = (𝑎0 + ∑ 𝑎0,𝑞𝐷𝑞,𝑖,𝑡
 
𝑞
) + (𝑎1 + ∑ 𝑎1,𝑞𝐷𝑞,𝑖,𝑡
2
𝑞=1
)𝐹𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + (𝑎2 + ∑ 𝑎2,𝑞𝐷𝑞,𝑖,𝑡
3
𝑞=1
)𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑖,𝑡
+ ∑ 𝑎𝑗𝐶𝑉𝑗,𝑖,𝑡
9
𝑗=3
+ 𝜀1,𝑖,𝑡 
(2. a) 
𝐹𝐺𝑖,𝑡 = (𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽0,𝑞𝐷𝑞,𝑖,𝑡
 
𝑞
) + (𝛽1 + ∑ 𝛽1,𝑞𝐷𝑞,𝑖,𝑡
2
𝑞=1
)𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + (𝛽2 + ∑ 𝛽2,𝑞𝐷𝑞,𝑖,𝑡
3
𝑞=1
)𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑖,𝑡
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑉𝑗,𝑖,𝑡
9
𝑗=3
+ 𝜀2,𝑖,𝑡 
(2. b) 
𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑖,𝑡 = (𝛾0 + ∑ 𝛾0,𝑞𝐷𝑞,𝑖,𝑡
 
𝑞
) + (𝛾1 + ∑ 𝛾1,𝑞𝐷𝑞,𝑖,𝑡
2
𝑞=1
)𝐹𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + (𝛾2 + ∑ 𝛾1,𝑞𝐷𝑞,𝑖,𝑡
2
𝑞=1
)𝐺𝑖,𝑡
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝐶𝑉𝑗,𝑖,𝑡
9
𝑗=3
+ 𝜀3,𝑖,𝑡 
(2. c) 
where, D is a vector of dummy variables with 𝑞 = (𝐸, 𝐸𝑈, 𝐻𝐷, 𝑇, 𝐶), which is employed in order 
to capture, in a piecewise fashion, potential non-linearities (Henderson et al., 2013). E is a dummy 
variable, that takes the value 1 when country i uses the euro as its currency and the value 0 when 
the country i uses its own national currency. Equivalently, EU is a dummy variable indicating 
whether country i has joined the European Union (not necessarily the euro) and HD is a dummy 
variable distinguishing the countries that have public debt exceeding the 90% level. 𝑇𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 , 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 =
(2000, … , 2012)′ is a vector of dummy variables that take the value of 1 to indicate a specific year 
and 0 elsewhere. This accounts for extraordinary macroeconomic effects, such as the beginning of 
the financial crisis in 2008-2009. Equivalently, 𝐶𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 , 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 = (𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑔𝑖𝑢𝑚, … , 𝑈𝐾)
′  is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 to indicate a specific country and 0 elsewhere. This 
accounts for country specific fixed effects. The combination of the two captures significant 
structural breaks in specific countries/time, due to regulatory changes, such as the 2003 labour 
market reforms in Germany. In addition, a conditioning set of exogenous variables, i.e., CV, is 
uniquely introduced in each equation in the model to account for known determinants of the 
endogenous variables and thus, reducing heteroskedasticity. 
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Eq (2.a) investigates the impact of financial growth on economic development. Recent literature 
provides empirical evidence that the link has dramatically weakened after the 1990s (e.g. Rousseau 
and Wachtel, 2011), especially for countries afflicted by financial crises. Under this scenario, 
coefficient 𝛼1would be statistically insignificant. If there is any differential effect resulting from 
the political, coefficient α2,EU
 , or monetary integration, coefficient α1,E
 , would have a statistically 
significant impact on GDP. Further, coefficients 𝑎2,𝐸𝑈
 , 𝑎2,𝐸
  and 𝑎2,𝐻𝐷
  investigate the potentially 
differential effect of excessive borrowing discussed in earlier literature (e.g. Prasad et al., 2007; 
Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010), within the European Union. 
Following relevant literature (e.g. King and Levine, 1993, Levine, 1997), potential endogeneity 
between financial growth and economic growth is also examined in equation (2.b). Coefficient β1 
measures the impact of GDP on financial growth. If both 𝑎1 and 𝛽1 are statistically significant, a 
bidirectional relationship may better describe the interaction within Europe. If only one is 
significant, the supply-leading, 𝑎1, or the demand-following, 𝛽1, hypothesis would be confirmed. 
Potentially differential effects for the EU or the euro are captured by 𝑎1,𝐸
 , 𝑎1,𝐸𝑈
  and 𝛽1,𝐸
 , 𝛽1,𝐸𝑈
 . 
Furthermore, Equation (2.c) explores how the aforementioned variables affect public borrowing 
levels. Coefficients 𝛾1  and 𝛾2  capture this effect, while any differential within the Eurozone, 
would be captured by coefficients γ1,𝐸𝑈
  and γ2,𝐸
 . The inclusion of DEBT as an endogenous 
variable in this system of equations also examines the role of public borrowing on development. 
Accelerated DEBT, i.e., for direct investments in fiscal policies, could have a direct impact on 
GDP and at least one of the coefficients α2 would be significant. In contrast, insignificant α2s, 
with 𝛽2  being significant, would mean that an investment for financial growth that further 
increases GDP would be a more appropriate strategy. If coefficients 𝛾1 and 𝛾2 are found to be 
significant too, this would indicate that either strategy may be a long-term engaging strategy rather 
than a short-term approach. 
B. Estimation 
This system of simultaneous equations is estimated with iterative GMM, with lags of dependent 
variables employed as instrumental variables in order to account for recursive effects. This method 
is preferred because it requires less strict distributional assumptions, while it accounts for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form. Economic growth and Financial growth 
might follow a lead lag relationship, but since potential structural endogeneity is primarily 
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investigated, a contemporaneous, simultaneous model is preferred over a VAR/VECM counterpart 
(Christopoulos and Tsional, 2005; Ang and McKibbin, 2007). This raises the importance of 
exploiting the dynamic features of the data in the instruments, rather than in the structural forms. 
We account for dynamic effects by using lags as instruments. This, according to previous literature 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995; Alonso-Borego and Arellano, 1996; 
Blundell and Bond, 1998), contributes to estimation in multiple ways: (i) the parameters are 
estimated under the assumption that they are not correlated with the error terms of subsequent 
periods; (ii) the structural parameters are estimated taking into consideration the dynamic structure 
of the data (iii) the endogenous component of the conditioning set, i.e., CV, which, contrary to FG 
and DEB, are assumed to be strictly exogenous, is extracted and thus, the parameters 𝛼𝑗 , 𝛽𝑗 , 𝛾𝑗 
capture their pure direct and indirect impact on growth. Estimation follows the steps below.  
𝛽 = (𝛼𝑚,𝑞
 𝛽𝑚,𝑞
 𝛾𝑚,𝑞
 )
′
, 𝑚 = 0, … ,10  and 𝑞 = (∅, 𝐸, 𝐸𝑈, 𝐻𝐷, 𝑇𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 , 𝐶𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦)′  is a vector of the 
parameters to be estimated, 𝜐 = (𝐺𝐷𝑃, 𝐹𝐺, 𝐷𝐸𝐵)′ a vector of all endogenous variables and 𝑧𝑟 =
𝐶𝑉𝑟, a vector of all control variables of each equation r = 1, 2, 3. 𝑒1,𝑡 = 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸[𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡|𝐻𝑖,𝑡] 
is the error term in (2.a), given the information set 𝐻𝑖,𝑡 of countries i up to time t, e2,t = FGi,t −
E[FGi,t|Hi,t] is the error term in (2.b) and e3,t = DEBi,t − E[DEBi,t|Hi,t] is the error term in (2.c).  
We employ the following moment conditions. In order to derive consistent and efficient parameter 
estimates the idiosyncratic error terms are estimated assuming normality. The forecasting error, 
er,t, is assumed to have a zero mean (E[fr,t
i (β, υi,t)] = E[er,t] = 0). Forecasting errors are assumed 
to be independent from each other (E[fr,t
k (β, υi,t)] = E[ex,i,tey,i,t] = 0, for (x ≠ y) ∈ r) and with 
homoscedastic, constant, variance (E[fr,t
var(β, υi,t)] = E [(er,t)
2
] = 𝜎er
2 ). In order to investigate 
the dynamic structure of the data (Levine, 2005), the errors should be serially uncorrelated 
(E[fr,t
l (β, υi,t)] = E[er,i,ter,i,t−j] = 0), and the regressors weakly exogenous. Therefore, previous 
lags of the exogenous regressors (levels) are assumed to be uncorrelated with er,t (E[fr,t
z (β, υr,t)] =
E[er,t ∗ zr,t−j
 ] = 0. In addition, in order to avoid the inclusion of weak instruments cross-sectional 
moment conditions are introduced alongside the endogenous variables E[fr,t
υ (β, υr,t)] =
E[er,t ⊗ υr,t−j
 ⊗ Qr,t−j
 ] = 0 , for   j = 0,1, … , T , here 𝑗 = 0,1 . The model is estimated with 
14 
 
iterative GMM and validity of the moment conditions is tested using the J-statistic (Nansen, 
1982).4 
C. Data 
This study employs annual, cross-sectional data on financial and macroeconomic indicators for 26 
European countries over the period from 1999 to 2012 as summarized in the table below.5 All 
variables are monetary (currency) and seasonally adjusted.  
Variable Definition 
MCAP Market Capitalization (% of GDP and in €). 
GDP Annual Gross Domestic Product (in €) 
INF Inflation (%) 
Interest Rates 10 Year Government Bond Yield (%) 
Trade Trade (Imports + Exports in €) 
Revenue General Government Revenue (in €) 
Expenditure General Government Total Expenditure (in €) 
Debt General Government Gross Debt (in €) 
Current Account Current Account Balance (in €) 
Savings Gross National Savings (in €) 
The primary concern refers to the proxy of financial growth. Levine (2005) argues that physical 
capital accumulation does not contribute much to economic growth (Jorgenson, 1995, 2005) and 
therefore a study of the link between financial growth and economic growth should focus on a 
measure of development, rather than on aggregated savings. Kose et al, (2009) also maintain that 
the macroeconomic impact of financial integration cannot be captured by conventional measures 
of integration and financial deepening and thus a market based measure is needed. Furthermore, 
                                                          
4 The sample means of (β, υi,t) = [fr,t
i (β, υi,t), fr,t
k (β, υi,t), fr,t
l (β, υi,t),  fr,t
var(β, υi,t), fr,t
υ (β, υi,t), fr,t
z (β, υr,t)]′ are defined 
as: g(β; SI,T) =
1
T
1
I
∑ ∑ f(β, υi,t)
T
t=1
I
i=1 , where SI,T contains the observations of υi,t−j, j = 1, … , T of a sample T. β is 
chosen so that g(β; SI,T) closely approximate f(β, υi,t). When the number of moment conditions, K, is larger than the 
number of parameters, L, the GMM estimator can be written as; β̂ = argmin
β
(g(β; SI,T)
′
∗ Ŵt ∗ g(β; SI,T)) , where Ŵt 
is a KxK semi-definite “weighting” matrix, such as that lim
T→∞
 
Ŵt → W (population). β̂ is estimated with “iterative” 
GMM, with a heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix (Newey and West, 1987) and the validity of model is 
tested using the J ≡ (g(β; ST)
′ ∗ Ŵt ∗ g(β; ST)) → χK−L
2  (Hansen, 1982). The initial hypothesis, (Ho) , is that the 
model is valid. J-statistic is asymptotically Chi-squared with K − L degrees of freedom. 
5 The data is collected from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database and International Monetary 
Fund source. Regression data is annual as a percentage of GDP. The 26 countries employed are in alphabetical order: 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden and United Kingdom (UK). Regional criteria have been applied alongside data availability. 
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Friedrich et al, (2012) suggest that excessive optimism set the base for irrationally capitalized 
expectations of stability and thus it led to excessive levels of borrowing, at a cost that was not fully 
reflecting fundamentals. We introduce public borrowing levels in our analysis as an integral part 
of the financial-economic growth nexus and thus, we postulate that any measure that does not 
capture market expectations could not reveal the, potentially endogenous, inter-relations between 
debt and the other two variables. Following Beck et al. (2000, 2008), MCAP, more precisely the 
% change of MCAP, is employed as a proxy for financial growth. This measure has been chosen 
on the grounds that it accounts not only for the quality and depth of the financial sector, but also 
for two other things. First, it is a collective measure of intra-country economic entities. Recent 
literature (Abiad et al., 2009; Heinemann et al., 2013; Imbs, 2006, 2007) emphasizes the 
importance of micro-level data. However, because our study focuses on governmental policies 
rather than on firm level analysis, the macro-level approach is more appropriate. Market 
capitalization, measures - albeit rigidly - financial growth as the sum of all individual entities 
within the economy. Thus it is a measure of financial activity that does not ignore firm specific 
effects. Second, it accounts for investor opinions concerning risk, both unsystematic (each 
individual firm) and systematic (the economy as a whole).  
Then the other fundamental variables in our modelling include economic growth and debt. With 
respect to economic growth, following Levine (1997), we use the % growth of GDP. We consider 
public borrowing levels, because in Europe they have been the major burden in the peripheral 
economies that amplified the impact of restrained capital flows. The level of debt in the sample 
period has been steadily increasing and therefore this variable is not stationary. Therefore, we 
employ the first % difference. We purport that this accounts also for the dynamic character of the 
panel data set we have employed and that it should be expected to be more correlated with 
changing expectations and thus, our measure of financial growth. In Europe, financial and political 
integration have been very significant aspects of economic growth and that the foundation of this 
relationship lies on capitalization of expectations. Optimism was reflected on market valuations 
and thus, on capital flows, which in turn allowed a better mobilization of resources and 
consequently growth. However, this growth was externally financed and at some point, public 
borrowing was restricting rather than financing growth. We postulate that the impact of 
expectations should be better reflected on the rate that financial growth and economic growth 
accelerate with respect to the rate the borrowing grows.  
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Another important element in our study is the distinction between differential degrees of 
integration. Kose et al., (2009) make an explicit distinction between de jure, i.e., explicit measures, 
such as capital controls, and de facto, i.e., implicit measures that reflect legal restrictions, of 
financial integration, suggesting that a combination of the two should better reflect the openness 
of an economy.6 In order to account for de jure measures we employ a combination of dummy 
variables that account for country specific and larger scale legislation effects. The country specific 
effects, C, capture implicitly the intensity of explicit measures among other unobservable effects. 
In addition, the dummy variables EU and E, capture the effects of two different levels of explicit 
legislation. The first is the political integration within the European Union and the second is the 
financial integration within the monetary union, namely the euro. Both are measures of differential 
degrees of integration, which are explicitly regulated on an integrated level. EU and E are expected 
to affect market expectations, thus, financial an depth growth and therefore, indirectly economic 
growth. However, in practice their impact on market openness of individual countries, i.e., 
captured by the combination of C, EU and E, might not be reflected on the de facto measures of 
financial integration. Therefore, we use the variable 𝑇𝑟𝑑𝑡 = 𝛥(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡), which captures changes 
in trade openness, measured as the sum of the monetary value of imports and exports. Trade 
openness is a conventional measure of de facto financial integration (Kose et al., 2009)  
Furthermore, other variables are also introduced in the model to account for known GDP 
determinants, thus reducing heteroskedasticity. CV = (EXP, REV, SAV, INF, IR, Trd, CAB) . 7 
Following early literature (Arrow and Kurz, 1970; Diamond, 1989), EXP = 𝛥log(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡) 
is used to capture changes in fiscal policies and in particular the impact of government spending 
on economic growth. Similarly, 𝑅𝐸𝑉 = 𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑡)  captures the other side of fiscal 
policies; changes in general government revenue. 𝐶𝐴𝐵 = 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝐺𝐷𝑃⁄  measures the 
current account balance as a proportion of GDP. Finally, in order to account for the convergence 
                                                          
6 Kose et al. (2009) argue that in practice there are explicit measures that limit capital flows, which are necessarily 
strictly imposed. On the contrary, other countries that might follow liberal practices might experience low capital 
flows. Consequently, in order to better capture nominal, i.e., de jure, and effective, i.e., de facto, integration, a 
combination of the two is needed.  
7 The suggested model tries, by no means, to investigate the determinants of economic or financial growth, or public 
debt. The focus lies on potential endogeneity, accounting for some control variables.  Please note that in (2.a), CAB is 
employed instead of Trade openness because the balance of imports/exports is expected to determine long-term 
growth. In contrast, in (2.b), Trade openness is preferred because it is a better indicator of total trading activity. In 
(2.c), inflation is excluded because it is expected to have a simultaneously increasing (higher monetary value) and 
decreasing (lower value of existing liabilities) impact on debt levels, and thus a non-significant impact.  
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in interest rates within the Eurozone, the 10 year government bond yields are employed. 𝐼𝑅 =
𝛥(𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡) is the change in prevailing yields and reflect changes in the fundamentals. 
This is closely linked to our measure of financial growth, which also captures investors’ 
expectations. 
IV. Empirical Findings 
A. Non-Parametric Analysis 
1. Initial Observations 
The average economic growth in figure 1 is positive, 5.29%, and overdispersed (std is 6.48%), 
which is somewhat expected due to the inclusion of both developing and developed economies, as 
well as a structural break in October 2008. The negative skewness (-0.0442) and the high kurtosis 
(5.6059) show that high dispersion is mainly due to the post-2008 contraction that many countries 
experienced. Furthermore, market capitalization accounts for around 65% of GDP, which shows 
that the financial sector plays a significant role in these economies. It is also highly dispersed, with 
a significantly long right tail (kurtosis is 11.5734 and skewness is 2.0959). In several cases the 
market value of listed companies exceeds GDP, by a maximum factor of 4.62, which indicates 
significant exuberance mainly recorded prior to 2008 (Shiller, 2005). The contribution of the 
political and financial integration to this confidence and its link with economic growth is the main 
focus of this study.  
DEBT accounts for approximately 61% of GDP. It has a longer right tail (skewness is 3.6013 and 
kurtosis is 20.8301). This shows that several countries sustain considerably higher debt levels, in 
some cases exceeding 100%. This should be more pronounced after 2008 where GDP declines 
without a proportional decrease in public debt. A negative median, -€0.728b, for CAB shows that 
imports exceed exports in most cases. Consistently with Trade, CAB is significantly overdispersed 
with some extreme observations at both ends of the distributions. This highlights how 
inhomogeneous the structure of the countries that constitute the union is. Literature recognizes the 
combination of negative CAB and high debt as a major determinant of increased exposure to 
macroeconomic shocks, especially under reduced flexibility induced by a monetary integration.  
2. Financial Growth and Economic Growth 
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Figure 2 presents graphically the link between economic growth, financial growth (Panels A-C) 
and MCAP (Panels D-F). Panels A shows that financial growth and economic growth tend to be 
positively correlated with countries exhibiting simultaneous financial growth and economic 
growth. According to panel B, this seems to be more intense in the countries that have joined the 
euro, since the dots seem to be more aligned to a positive correlation, unlike the countries that have 
kept their national currencies, which exhibit more observations closer to the XX’ axis. Panel D 
shows an overall declining link between MCAP and economic growth. However there are several 
large observations close to the YY’ axis, showing that there are countries that achieve high market 
value without necessarily experiencing high economic growth (or small increases in economic 
activity can spark high market values). The distinction becomes clearer in panels E and F. In the 
Eurozone the link between market values and economic growth seems to be exponentially 
increasing. In contrast, in the countries that have kept their national currencies two subgroups are 
observed. In the first group higher economic growth is not associated with high market values, 
while in the second, some very high figures are observed for MCAP in countries with low 
economic growth. The overall link tends to be rather negative, but with no clear trend.  
Figure 3 presents the relationship between economic, financial growth and debt. It reveals that 
indeed economic growth and financial growth appear to be linked and this link seems to strengthen 
over time, in particular after 2008. In the period prior to 2008, panels B and C reveal that the link 
is relatively weaker in non-Eurozone countries. However, after 2008, the volatility of both 
financial growth and economic growth is higher for this sub-sample, indicating that the euro might 
cushion the impact of a macroeconomic shock on participating countries. Several studies (e.g. 
Manning, 2003; Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011) report that the link between economic growth and 
financial growth has weakened significantly, especially after 1990. However, in the period 
following 2008 their link appears to strengthen again, following a lead-lag pattern. This shows that 
this link might either be cyclical, i.e. depending on macroeconomic cycles, or that it is a natural 
consequence of a macroeconomic shock.8  
                                                          
8 In this study we investigate the latter, without necessarily ignoring the first. We focus on the link between financial 
growth and economic growth and the impact of monetary integration. MCAP as a measure of financial growth reflects 
market expectations and thus is expected to better capture potential “euro” effects. If there are cyclical patterns, they 
should be reflected on market prices, assuming rationality. Relaxing the rationality or investigating the link between 
business cycles and macroeconomic shocks would deviate from the current focus, which is potential “euro” effects. 
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3. Bear vs Bull Market and Debt 
Another observation refers to the nature of the link. Panels A-E show that economic growth 
changes are mostly observed after financial growth sparks. This shows that changes in GDP 
influence market expectations, which seem to precede any changes in economic growth. There is 
a notable “bull” market period starting at around 2000, being followed by a strong “bear” market 
period after 2008. The link between financial growth and economic growth seems to strengthen 
significantly around 2008 and MCAP notably captures subsequent GDP changes, especially in the 
Eurozone. This shows that the markets discount timely information about economic growth. 
Consequently, the dynamic structure chosen to investigate the direction of the relationship in 
equations (2.a), (2.b) and (2.c) seems to be justified.  
Panels D and E focus on countries with public debt levels beyond 90% of GDP. During “bull” 
markets, economic growth is more moderate, about 5-6% p.a., than in countries with lower debt, 
about 6-10% p.a., while it decreases significantly during “bear” markets. Panels F-H distinguish 
between Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries. Panel F shows that, overall, higher borrowing is 
associated with exponentially lower economic growth. According to Panel H, this is consistent in 
non-Eurozone countries. In contrast, countries that have joined the euro appear to still be able to 
achieve higher economic growth. The euro seems to improve access to financing, which can further 
assist growth. Investigating this further figure 4 presents the relationship between the endogenous 
variables before and after the outburst of the financial crisis in 2008. The first column confirms 
previous findings. However, panels F and J, show that after 2008, countries that have not joined 
the Eurozone exhibit significantly lower growth across greater financial activity. Also, panels E 
and H show that the link between financial growth and economic growth is significantly stronger 
in a bearish market, though it does not disappear after a macroeconomic shock. 
B. Parametric Analysis 
1. Financial Growth and Economic Growth 
Table 1 presents the estimation results of the model presented in equations (2.a), (2.b) and (2.c.) 
Focusing on the full sample, no significant link is observed between financial growth and 
economic growth in non-Eurozone countries. The highest absolute value of t-statistic is 1.67, 
showing that the two figures are rather independent. However, financial growth appears to have a 
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significant increasing effect on economic growth in countries that have adopted the euro (FG*E is 
0.0311 and t-statistic is 2.53). In parallel, looking at the determinants of financial growth, a 
significant (2.04) coefficient of 0.8012 for the EU dummy shows that G has an increasing impact 
on financial growth for countries that have joined the European Union. This effect is found to be 
stronger for countries that have additionally joined the euro (coefficient is 0.3015 and t-statistic is 
3.13). Consequently, the link between the two figures is present in Europe, and they are found to 
be endogenous in the Eurozone, but not necessarily within the European Union.  
In addition, political integration does not appear to have any significant direct impact on either of 
the figures, since the coefficient of the EU dummy remains rather insignificant. In contrast, a 
significant (3.01) coefficient of 0.7433 of the E dummy shows that monetary integration seems to 
accelerate financial growth only, without any significant effect on economic growth.  
A possible explanation for this finding could depend on the existence of the European Union, 
particularly of the Eurozone. The EU is significantly larger than any single country and it is 
therefore to be more resistant to market pressure than a single entity. Consequently, increased 
endogeneity between market condition and fundamentals should be expected. Monetary 
integration appears to have an increasing direct and indirect impact on financial growth, which in 
turn further enhances economic growth, engaging into a spiral relationship. The absence of this 
link in the non-EU countries leads to the conclusion that the contribution of EU is significant. 
Given that MCAP captures expectations, this contribution may be linked to increased confidence 
and thus, improved access to financing. Consequently, for a given change in GDP, market reacts 
more positively in Eurozone member states, probably because investors anticipate lower exposure 
to macroeconomic risk. This allows an investment flow that can further increase GDP.  
However, this spiral effect does not seem to be consistent outside the Eurozone, not even in other 
(non-euro) member states. EU membership would assist countries with positive GDP changes to 
further increase the total market value, but this increased market value has no further impact on 
GDP, unless the country has joined the euro. From a market perspective, this seems to be 
distinctively different from EU membership. Market participants seem to capitalize their 
expectations for future political stability and thus for lower macroeconomic risk on current prices 
when a country joins the EU. This might be derived from expectations about political of financial 
stability. However, this seems not to be a sufficient condition to further increase their GDP and 
can only occur if they also adopt the common currency. When they do, they abandon their 
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monetary tools and, thus, they need to have discipline, aiming at increasing their competitive 
advantages. This, in combination with a higher level of political and monetary integration, seems 
to lead to higher stability expectations, which attract further economic development. This is a first 
sign that the euro is suitable for countries which anticipate that they can gain on the long term from 
the spiral link between financial growth and economic growth. 
Moreover, this spiral link seems to be strongly present prior to 2008 only within the Eurozone. 
GDP has an increasing impact on financial growth (e.g. G*E is 0.3589 and t-statistic is 2.01), 
which in turn further increases G (e.g. FG*E is 0.0513 and t-statistic is 2.83). This shows that the 
euro could accelerate economic growth in countries that can benefit from this spiral link. Again, 
only financial growth is found to be directly affected by monetary integration, while political 
integration is not found to have any significant direct impact on both figures.  
Furthermore, the euro appears to play a smoothing role too during the period following the outburst 
of the financial crisis. GDP improvements still increase market values only within the Eurozone 
(e.g. G*E is 0.2758 and t-statistic is 2.21), but now the Eurozone countries seem to be less exposed 
to market fluctuations. In more detail, an estimate of 0.1901 (2.60) shows that in non-Eurozone 
countries changes in GDP follow changes in market value. The mostly negative financial growth 
experienced during the post 2008 period appears to have a strong negative impact on the economic 
growth of these economies. In contrast, a negative estimate for the Eurozone countries of -0.1548 
(-2.09) indicates that this effect is milder for countries that have adopted the euro. Negative 
financial growth still negatively affects economic growth, but the impact is considerably smaller 
in Eurozone member states. This indicates that non-Eurozone countries appear to be more exposed 
to market volatility after a macroeconomic shock than countries that belong to a monetary union. 
This highlights an additional beneficial impact of the euro, which seems to bate the impact of 
macroeconomic shocks.  
2. Financial Growth, Economic Growth and Debt 
The previous section highlights the contribution of the euro in accelerating both financial growth 
and economic growth, as well as their spiral link. This might be observed due to improved access 
to financing, which could be a major determinant of the spiral link. Equation (2.c) focuses on the 
impact of economic growth and financial growth on public debt growth, as well as on endogeneity 
issues. 
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The last section of table 1 shows that monetary integration appears to have a significant impact on 
public borrowing levels. Eurozone member states exhibit significantly higher (e.g. 0.0248 and t-
statistic is 2.11) debt growth, both before (e.g. 0.1893 and t-statistic is 2.10) and after (e.g. 0.0199 
and t-statistic is 1.99) 2008, while political integration does not exhibit any significant marginal 
impact. This is a sign of improved access to financing, probably due to additional confidence 
induced by monetary integration. This is further complemented when a member state experiences 
economic growth, but not necessarily upon financial growth. In more detail, there is a statistically 
significant difference in borrowing levels between member and non-member states. The impact of 
G is insignificant for countries that have not joined the EU (e.g. coefficient is -0.1842 and t-statistic 
is -0.36), but it has a rather increasing impact for member states (e.g. 0.1814 and t-statistic is 1.94), 
especially when the euro is the currency adopted (e.g. 0.2321 and t-statistic is 5.06). In contrast, 
no significant link appears to exist between financial growth and DEB. This shows that a country’s 
fundamentals are more important than its financial profile in improving its borrowing position. 
Further, the mostly insignificant coefficients of E and EU in the last column indicate that any euro 
effect on borrowing becomes significantly less important during a “bear” market wherever 
financial commitments seem to be prioritised over economic development. 
Naturally, the focus shifts on how the improved borrowing position (higher growth of debt 
accumulation) affects the spiral link between financial growth and economic growth. The first 
observation is derived from the third panel of the first section of Table 1. DEB seems to be 
endogenous to GDP growth with differing impact for member and non-member states. Higher debt 
growth seems to have a limiting impact on economic growth in countries that have not joined the 
euro (e.g. coefficient is -0.5076 and t-statistics is -2.08). In contrast, the higher borrowing capacity 
of euro member states seems to have an overall marginally positive impact on economic growth 
(e.g., 0.0075 (1.95) for DEB*E and 0.4863 (2.01) for DEB*EU). Consequently, the euro appears 
to have another indirect positive impact on economic growth. The Eurozone countries seem to 
have higher credibility that can be used to draw more funds, which can lead to further development.  
However, there is a lack of consistency before and after 2008. During the booming period prior to 
2008, higher debt growth has a positive impact (e.g., 0.0190 (2.27)) on economic growth, even 
when debt exceeds 90% of GDP (e.g., 0.0380 (2.57)). In contrast, in the years following the 
sovereign bond crisis, increases in debt seem to significantly limit growth opportunities (e.g., -
0.0267 (-2.77)) in the Eurozone, especially for countries with high borrowing levels (e.g., -0.0413 
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(-2.37)). This, along with the notable absence of “euro effects” on debt, raises some concerns about 
the suitability, or the overall impact, of improved access to financing due to monetary integration. 
In the previous section, the euro has been found to protect countries from erratic market 
movements, by smoothening the negative impact of negative financial growth, but the limited 
monetary flexibility appears to significantly slow down economic growth during a bear market. 
Improved access to financing might endogenously accelerate economic growth, but during bear 
market periods financial obligations are prioritized and thus, the increased financing might be 
considered as “over-borrowing”. In this case it seems to reverse the spiral link between financial 
growth and economic growth and thus, lead to recession.  
Consequently, the benefits from the endogenous relationship between debt increases and economic 
growth are not unconditional. The euro might assist member states to achieve higher economic 
growth, but it might also lead them to unmanageable borrowing levels. This concern seems to be 
reflected on the impact of debt growth on financial growth, too. The third panel of the second 
section of Table 1 shows that higher DEB consistently lead to lower marker values. This slows 
down the spiral effect of the endogenous economic growth and financial growth. However, this 
happens only in the Eurozone countries (e.g., -0.5756 (-4.73)) and not in member states that have 
not joined the euro (e.g., 0.2582 (2.57)).  
These findings lead to the conclusion that markets perceive the euro to have a dual role. First, it is 
found to have a beneficial impact by leading to an endogenous spiral link between financial growth 
and economic growth. However, this spiral link is bounded by borrowing levels. Positive debt 
growth might lead to higher growth during bull market conditions, but it reverses this spiral link 
during bear market conditions. This second role of euro, has a rather limiting impact on economic 
growth, especially when the increase in financing is not accompanied by improvement in the 
country fundamentals. The increased financing might improve GDP when the macroeconomic 
conditions allow for it, but it might also lead to unsustainable financing. This might constitute the 
foundations of what is reported in the literature as “bad” growth. Countries can improve their 
access to financing by joining the monetary union, but unless resources are utilized efficiently in 
order to improve fundamentals, economic growth might be fragile and susceptible to volatile 
macroeconomic conditions.  
Consequently, the suitability of adopting the euro should depend on the ability of each country to 
benefit from the increased financing by engaging on the spiral endogenous link between financial 
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growth and economic growth, which could eventually improve fundamentals. Excessive 
borrowing without engaging on this link could lead to obviation of market confidence, which 
introduces an additional macroeconomic risk. 
3. Robustness 
The robustness of the empirical findings presented above is tested by considering a potential long 
term equilibrium among the endogenous variables, by considering a different estimation method, 
as well as by testing the strength of the instrumental variables. Table 2 presents the estimation 
results for the model presented in equations (2.a), (2.b) and (2.c). Parameters have been estimated 
considering an error correction specification, as well as using the Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
(SUR) method, which recognizes potential cross-correlations assuming that the innovations of the 
system are i.i.d. 
In more detail, the bottom panel of Table 1 reports that all variables employed in the model are 
stationary, while the bottom part of the Table 3 reports that the residuals of the full sample 
estimation (Total in Table 1) are also stationary and non-heteroskedastic (cross-sectionally or over 
time). This indicates that the three endogenous variables might be cointegrated, exhibiting a long-
term, equilibrium relationship. The first three columns of Table 2, present the estimates of the 
parameters of the model in equations (2.a), (2.b) and (2.c) with an error correction term. The error 
correction term is the lagged residual of the GDP regressed on a constant, MCAP and Debt (all 
values are logged). The cointegration term is a significant determinant of economic growth and 
financial growth, but not of debt growth. This indicates that MCAP and GDP are strongly linked 
to each other, following a long term equilibrium, while Debt only indirectly affects their growth. 
The presence of the cointegration term, as well as the different estimation method produces 
consistent estimates with the GMM estimation (Table 1) 
Furthermore, Table 3 presents the correlations between the regressors and the instrumental 
variables, which are the first lag of regressors. The instruments appear to be highly correlated with 
the corresponding regressors and uncorrelated with the GMM residuals. Finally, the cross 
correlation between the GMM residuals appears to be rather small. 
V. Concluding Remarks 
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In this study, we investigate the suitability of adopting the euro, by revisiting the interaction 
between financial growth and economic growth in Europe. We introduce the growth of public 
financing as an integral component and investigate endogeneity among all three. We also 
investigate for potentially differential between the impact of political (European Union) and 
financial (Eurozone) integration.  
The empirical findings indicate that neither political nor monetary integration exhibit any direct 
impact on economic growth. Their impact is rather indirect through financial and debt growth. In 
more detail, monetary integration appears to allow countries to borrow more and accelerates 
financial growth, both directly and indirectly through improvements in country fundamentals. 
Increased market values and improved financing further accelerate economic growth, indicating a 
spiral endogenous link between the three. However, this link is only observed within Eurozone 
member states, highlighting the existence of a “euro effect”. This effect seems to be strong, 
especially during bear market conditions prior to 2008, when even countries with high debt 
balances can benefit from the spiral link and experience higher economic growth. In contrast, 
during the bearish market conditions in the post 2008 period, a sharp correction of market values 
and economic growth is observed, especially for countries with high levels of debt. This reverses 
the afore-mentioned spiral link and leads into recession.  
Consequently, the euro is found to play a dual role. First, it has a positive indirect impact on 
economic growth, by allowing the countries to engage into a spiral endogenous link between 
financial growth and economic growth, as well as debt. Improved access to financing allows for 
more investments, which increase GDP. This increases market values, which have a further 
boosting impact on economic growth. EU members that have not joined the euro can still draw 
marginally more funds upon higher economic growth, but the lack of the common currency does 
not create the necessary confidence to enhance a synergetic endogeneity. However, this 
exuberance might lead countries to borrow more introducing a “moral hazard” of “over-
borrowing”. This second role of the euro introduces a macroeconomic risk, where countries might 
pursue economic growth through an improved credit profile due to the monetary integration, rather 
than through an improvement in country fundamentals. This might set the foundation for “bad” 
growth, which reverses the afore-mentioned spiral endogenous link after macroeconomic shocks, 
leading to recession. Therefore, the interaction between the dual role of the euro, which is unique 
for each country, should be a major determinant of the suitability of adopting the common 
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currency. On a larger scale, European policies should focus either on distinguishing between 
“good” and “bad” borrowing and thus between “good” and “bad” growth or on structural changes 
that will allow countries to benefit from the financial-economic growth momentum.  
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 Figure 1. Distribution and Descriptive Statistics 
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(% change) 
Fin Growth  
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 Minimum -0.2289 -0.7302 0.0315 0.0633 -0.8386 0.0140 1.35E+09 -1.01E+11 5.63E+09 -1.05E+11 -0.0170 1.60E+09 
 Std. Dev. 0.0648 0.3880 0.5451 0.4869 0.1557 0.0232 2.92E+11 2.01E+10 4.15E+11 3.21E+10 0.0218 3.13E+11 
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 Kurtosis 5.6059 4.5790 11.5734 20.8301 23.8638 15.8147 5.2145 10.6485 8.1683 16.6138 8.8387 5.0984 
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Figure 1 presents the histogram of the variables employed. The bars present the frequencies while the lines are the normalized empirical distributions. The table on the bottom 
of this figure presents the descriptive statistics of the variables employed, as well as the results of the Im et al. (1997) unit root test. The null hypothesis is that there is a unit 
root, either on the level or the first difference of the variables employed. 
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Figure 2. Economic Growth and Market Capitalization. Eurozone and National Currencies 
A D 
  
B E 
  
C F 
  
Figure 1 presents economic growth, defined as % change of GDP, over market capitalization, defined as MCAP 
as % of GDP, and financial growth, defined as % change of MCAP, across all countries, as well as across 
countries that have joined euro and countries that have kept their national currency. The last column presents the 
Granger causality test for GDP and MCAP. 
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Figure 3. Financial, Economic Growth and Debt  
A. Total F 
  
B. Eurozone D. Debt<90% G 
   
C. National Currencies E. Debt>90% H 
   
The first two columns of figure 2 present the average financial growth and economic growth, as well as the average level of depth over the sample period, dissected into two 
sub-samples; countries that have joined the euro and countries that have not, as well countries with debt levels higher than 90% and countries with less than 90%. The last 
column links economic growth and debt levels across sample, under national currencies and in the Eurozone. 
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Figure 4. Economic, Financial Growth and Debt Levels. Inter-relations 
A. All Countries D. All Countries-Before G. All Countries-After 
   
B. Eurozone E. Eurozone-Before H. Eurozone-After 
   
C. National Currencies F. National Currencies-Before J. National Currencies-After 
   
Figure 3 presents the average economic growth across different levels of debt and financial growth for all countries, Eurozone and countries with national currencies. The 
subsamples are further dissected into the period prior to and after 2008. 
0-0.15
0.45-0.6
>1.05
-0,2
-0,1
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
Debt 
(% GDP)
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 G
ro
w
th
Financial 
Growth
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
0-0.2
0.6-0.8
>1.2
Financial 
Growth
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 G
ro
w
th
Debt 
(% GDP)
-0,2
0
0,2
0,4
0-0.2
0.4-0.6
0.8-1
Financial 
Growth
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 G
ro
w
th
Debt 
(% GDP)
0
0,05
0,1
0-0.15
0.45-0.6
>1.05
Debt 
(% GDP)
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 g
ro
w
th
Financial
Growth
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
0-0.25
0.75-1
Financial 
Growth
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 G
ro
w
th
Debt 
(% GDP)
-0,05
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
0-0.2
0.4-0.6
0.8-1
Financial 
Growth
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 G
ro
w
th
Debt 
(% GDP)
-0,2
-0,1
0
0,1
0,2
0-0.25
Financial 
Growth
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 G
ro
w
th
Debt 
(% GDP)
-0,05
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
0,2
0-0.25
0.75-1
Financial
Growth
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 G
ro
w
th
Debt
(% GDP)
-0,2
-0,1
0
0,1
0,2
0-0.25
0.5-0.75
>1.25
Financial 
Growth
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 G
ro
w
th
Debt 
(% GDP)
38 
 
Table 1. Estimation Results 
 Growth  Financial Growth  Debt Growth 
  Total Before After  Total Before  After  Total Before After 
Interc 0.1725 0.1792 0.1802 0.1852 0.1548  -0.5993 -0.4198 -0.6750 -0.6244 -0.4124  0.2060 0.2342 0.2408 0.2387 0.2175 
 (4.76) (4.74) (4.29) (4.09) (3.17)  (-2.32) (-1.56) (-2.09) (-1.82) (0.31)  (1.49) (1.64) (2.44) (2.1) (1.61) 
E -0.0159 -0.0201 -0.0158 -0.0223 -0.01784  0.7433 0.8204 0.7952 0.8517 0.7763  0.0248 0.0197 0.1893 0.0221 0.0199 
 (-1.24) (-1.33) (-1.20) (-1.35) (-1.29)  (3.01) (3.14) (3.09) (3.21) (3.11)  (2.11) (2.17) (2.10) (2.37) (1,97) 
EU -0.0052  -0.0064    0.1849  0.1634    0.0147  0.0148   
 (-0.93)  (-1.01)    (1.94)  (1.89)    (1.88)  (1.89)   
FG -1.1301 0.0057 -0.7675 -0.0195 0.1901        -0.5576 0.1033 -0.2874 0.0769 0.1134 
 (-1.67) (0.34) (-1.56) (-1.51) (2.6)        (-0.74) (1.71) (-0.37) (1.17) (0.45) 
FG*E 0.0311 0.0313 0.0551 0.0513 -0.1548        -0.1450 -0.1325 -0.0280 -0.0531 -0.1838 
 (2.53) (2.46) (3.33) (2.83) (-2.09)        (-1.88) (-1.67) (-0.29) (-0.54) (-0.75) 
FG*EU 0.1544  0.1484          0.6883  0.3971   
  (1.71)   (1.52)                 (0.91)   (0.51)     
G       -0.7069 0.7946 -0.8482 0.7171 0.9850  -0.1842 -0.0348 -0.3240 -0.4537 0.5095 
       (-0.84) (1.52) (-0.94) (0.79) (1.37)  (-0.36) (-0.12) (-0.64) (-0.92) (0.96) 
G*E       0.3015 3.4359 0.2750 3.3589 0.2758  0.2321 0.2349 0.2587 0.2577 0. 0877 
       (3.13) (3.39) (2.75) (2.01) (2.21)  (5.06) (4.96) (4.21) (4.15) (1.21) 
G*EU       0.801  0.9378    0.1814  0.2488   
             (2.04)   (2.03)      (1.94)   (2.05)     
DEB -0.5076 -0.0251 -0.4615 -0.0709 0.0464  0.5008 0.6366 0.6839 0.9190 0.2404       
 (-2.08) (-1.76) (-2.61) (-2.32) (0.69)  (1.06) (2.96) (1.29) (3.09) (0.77)       
DEB*E 0.0075 0.0070 0.0190 0.0116 -0.0267  -0.5756 -0.5875 -0.4435 -0.4553 -0.4978       
 (1.95) (1.94) (2.27) (2.72) (-2.77)  (-4.73) (-4.69) (-2.22) (-2.18) (-3.33)       
DEB*EU 0.4863  0.3844    0.2582  0.4242         
 (2.01)  (2.18)    (2.57)  (2.89)         
DEB*HD 0.0221 0.0203 0.0380 0.0378 -0.0413  0.0268 0.0617 -0.2092 -0.1903 0.1920       
  (1.34) (1.17) (2.57) (2.33) (-2.37)  (0.24) (0.53) (-1.35) (-1.17) (1.22)            
Exp -0.4183 -0.3956 0.2029 0.1915 -0.9926  0.4895 0.4379 0.186 0.5034 0.2062  -0.1832 -0.1846 -0.1870 -0.1478 -0.2757 
 (-1.51) (-1.37) (0.69) (0.59) (-2.1)  (2.63) (2.26) (1.77) (1.61) (0.94)  (-1.83) (-1.79) (-0.5) (-0.39) (-1.44) 
Rev 0.0839 0.0475 -0.3812 -0.4064 0.4025  -0.4599 -0.4241 -0.5361 -0.4835 -0.3220  0.3516 0.3146 0.1272 0.1549 0.4626 
 (0.31) (0.17) (-1.36) (-1.32) (0.81)  (-2.59) (-2.3) (-1.91) (-1.67) (-1.33)  (3.43) (3.28) (1.07) (1.04) (3.47) 
Sav 0.3908 0.3262 0.3989 0.3884 0.1937  0.3804 0.3633 0.5319 0.4665 -0.1794  -0.6771 -0.6556 -0.5671 -0.5793 -0.6765 
 (1.26) (1.01) (1.32) (1.18) (0.34)  (1.82) (1.69) (1.81) (1.49) (-0.52)  (-6.98) (-6.67) (-3.73) (-3.66) (-4.46) 
Trade       0.1946 0.1432 0.3977 0.3209 0.2193  -0.2560 -0.2554 -0.2640 -0.2555 -0.2855 
       (1.93) (1.38) (2.63) (2.05) (1.54)  (-4.92) (-4.81) (-3.75) (-3.54) (-3.1) 
CAB 0.0178 0.0124 0.0251 0.0160 0.0120             
 (1.21) (0.81) (1.73) (1.03) (0.39)             
IR -0.0047 -0.0049 -0.0038 -0.0040 -0.0056  -0.0012 -0.0017 -0.0008 -0.0010 -0.0017  -0.0055 -0.0059 -0.0032 -0.0041 -0.0071 
 (-2.97) (-3.01) (-2.14) (-2.17) (-3.21)  (-0.91) (-1.01) (-0.86) (-0.90) (-1.03)  (-4.85) (-5.93) (-3.98) (-4.02) (-5.78) 
Inf 0.5111 0.4794 0.7033 0.6902 0.3609  -0.2522 -0.2091 -0.2169 -0.2075 -0.1589       
  (6.51) (5.82) (9.21) (8.24) (2.29)  (-4.46) (-3.56) (-2.25) (-2.06) (-2.42)       
J 3.08 5.76 7.14 6.07 4.55             
p (0.80) (0.45) (0.31) (0.41) (0.60)             
Table 1 presents the estimation results for the model in equations (2.a), (2.b) and (2.c). Total refers to the full sample, while before and after include the estimation results for 
the periods prior to and after 2008. An additional column is added in the “Total” and “Before” sections, where the same models are estimated, excluding the EU dummy 
variable. All countries in the sample have joined the Eurozone by 2012, independently of their decision to join the euro. In order to avoid estimation problems, EU was excluded. 
J-statistics is reported in pairs for the total, before and after period. All estimations include dummy variables to account for time and country fixed effects.
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Table 2. Robustness Test 
 Equilibrium (GMM)  SUR Estimation  
 G FG DEBT  G FG DEB  
Interc 0.1395 -0.4221 0.2257  0.1624 -0.4476 0.2136  
 (5.16) (1.99) (1.54)  (5.11) (-2.14) (1.64)  
E -0.0478 -0.1591 0.1423  -0.0491 0.6395 0.0193  
 (-1.96) (-2.64) (3.36)  (-1.91) (3.46) (3.61)  
EU -0.0045 -0.0026 -0.0433  -0.0050 0.1720 0.0160  
 (-0.23) (-1.56) (0.66)  (-0.27) (-1.55) (1.73)  
FG -1.0091  -0.0723  -1.0604  -0.4281  
 (-1.38)  (-0.69)  (-1.78)  (-0.43)  
FG*E 0.0261  -0.2315  0.0302  -0.2264  
 (2.10)  (-1.89)  (2.36)  (-1.92)  
FG*EU 0.0817  0.2719  0.1641  0.2640  
 (1.71)  (0.95)  (1.85)  (0.97)  
G  -1.1429 -0.0883   -0.9447 -0.0674  
  (-1.26) (-0.45)   (-0.56) (-0.11)  
G*E  0.9257 0.3883   0.6226 0.4319  
  (2.06) (2.42)   (3.89) (3.38)  
G*EU  0.6651 0.1343   0.5089 0.1441  
  (1.66) (0.50)   (2.38) (1.65)  
DEB -0.0443 0.4457   -0.4195 0.6429   
 (-1.75) (1.71)   (-1.49) (1.17)   
DEB*E 0.0918 -0.1850   0.0959 -0.2280   
 (2.91) (-2.33)   (3.19) (-2.97)   
DEB*EU 0.4115 0.8209   0.4045 0.5764   
 (2.46) (2.66)   (2.01) (2.59)   
DEB*HD 0.0092 0.1282   0.0163 0.0921   
 (1.41) (0.91)   (1.46) (0.91)   
Exp -0.1492 0.2456 -0.2893  -0.2110 0.2381 -0.2912  
 (-1.37) (1.82) (-2.13)  (-1.33) (2.80) (-1.75)  
Rev 0.1337 -0.1008 0.4249  0.0904 -0.4752 0.4258  
 (0.92) (-2.58) (4.87)  (1.41) (-3.01) (5.06)  
Sav 0.3400 0.1906 -0.7069  0.3474 0.2562 -0.7103  
 (2.05) (2.43) (-7.51)  (2.44) (2.26) (-7.83)  
Trade  0.2757 -0.2821   0.1946 -0.2823  
  (1.76) (-5.65)   (1.83) (-5.86)  
CAB 0.0969    0.0369    
 (0.64)    (1.26)    
IR -0.0043 -0.0002 -0.0067  -0.0040 -0.0001 -0.0071  
 (-2.68) (-0.01) (-3.78)  (-2.73) (-0.01) (-4.43)  
Inf 0.4244 0.2141   0.3093 -0.2109   
 (2.21) (2.27)   (3.71) (-2.33)   
Co- 0.0181 0.1501 0.0086      
integration (2.89) (2.62) (0.37)      
J 2.38 
(0.88) 
     
p      
Table 2 presents the estimation results of the model presented in equations (2.a), (2.b) and (2.c), with two 
alternative methods. The ne three columns present the estimation results employing the GMM method, where a 
cointegration term is added. The error correction term is computed as 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 = log(GDP) − c0 − c1log(MCAP) −
c2log(Debt). The following three columns present the estimation results employing the SUR method, where the 
residuals are allowed to be cross-correlated, but they are i.i.d overall. 
. 
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Table 3. Correlation Matrix 
T 
 
T-1 
E1 E2 E3 E EU HD G E* 
G 
EU* 
G 
FG E* 
FG 
EU* 
FG 
DEB E* 
DEB 
EU* 
DEB 
HD* 
DEB 
EXP REV SAV TRADE CAB INF 
E 0.00 -0.03 0.05 0.96 0.40 0.36 -0.27 0.48 -0.08 -0.15 -0.10 -0.18 0.38 0.79 0.48 0.36 0.36 0.28 -0.11 -0.08 0.10 -0.16 
EU 0.00 -0.04 0.08 0.50 0.84 0.19 -0.31 0.28 0.10 -0.12 -0.06 -0.15 0.31 0.41 0.57 0.19 0.24 0.13 -0.23 -0.10 -0.01 -0.21 
HD -0.01 0.06 0.04 0.38 0.16 1.00 -0.07 0.25 0.00 -0.08 -0.07 -0.09 0.71 0.72 0.67 1.00 0.25 0.07 -0.31 -0.24 -0.16 0.00 
G -0.05 -0.07 -0.09 -0.24 -0.37 -0.07 0.75 0.00 0.15 -0.06 0.03 -0.04 -0.34 -0.24 -0.39 -0.07 -0.33 -0.16 0.31 0.19 -0.07 0.36 
E*G 0.02 -0.06 -0.01 0.58 0.24 0.29 -0.04 0.75 0.08 -0.12 -0.09 -0.13 0.15 0.42 0.22 0.27 0.04 0.11 0.11 0.04 -0.06 0.10 
EU*G 0.03 -0.14 -0.06 0.09 0.29 0.06 0.12 0.21 0.75 -0.11 -0.01 -0.13 -0.10 0.02 0.02 0.05 -0.16 -0.03 0.18 0.12 -0.07 0.23 
FG 0.04 0.02 -0.03 -0.08 0.00 -0.09 0.35 0.17 0.33 0.72 0.13 0.22 -0.16 -0.13 -0.10 -0.10 -0.21 0.00 0.29 0.17 -0.03 0.26 
E*FG -0.01 0.06 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.07 0.16 0.29 0.17 0.15 0.72 0.16 -0.11 -0.08 -0.09 -0.08 -0.11 0.02 0.20 0.11 -0.02 0.14 
EU*FG 0.03 -0.04 0.00 -0.06 0.04 -0.09 0.31 0.21 0.36 0.22 0.15 0.73 -0.10 -0.12 -0.07 -0.10 -0.14 0.01 0.23 0.17 -0.03 0.21 
DEB 0.00 0.04 0.29 0.39 0.27 0.72 -0.25 0.20 -0.11 -0.08 -0.07 -0.06 0.99 0.76 0.90 0.72 0.53 0.25 -0.52 -0.47 0.03 -0.09 
E*DEB 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.79 0.33 0.70 -0.23 0.39 -0.07 -0.12 -0.07 -0.13 0.74 0.97 0.76 0.71 0.45 0.26 -0.32 -0.38 0.08 -0.14 
EU*DEB 0.00 0.02 0.20 0.53 0.55 0.68 -0.30 0.27 -0.03 -0.08 -0.08 -0.10 0.87 0.80 0.96 0.68 0.48 0.24 -0.47 -0.42 0.02 -0.18 
HD*DEB -0.01 0.06 0.14 0.37 0.16 1.00 -0.08 0.24 0.00 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 0.71 0.73 0.68 1.00 0.26 0.07 -0.31 -0.25 -0.16 0.00 
EXP 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.33 0.19 0.25 -0.27 0.11 -0.17 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.57 0.44 0.52 0.25 0.94 0.75 -0.34 -0.24 0.09 0.03 
REV 0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.31 0.06 0.08 -0.19 0.15 -0.15 -0.03 -0.03 -0.09 0.22 0.26 0.20 0.07 0.74 0.97 0.27 -0.18 0.19 -0.02 
SAV -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.22 -0.29 0.16 0.05 0.05 -0.07 -0.05 -0.11 -0.59 -0.32 -0.57 -0.31 -0.32 0.25 0.90 0.18 0.08 0.00 
TRADE -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 -0.24 0.20 0.04 0.14 0.05 0.06 0.08 -0.48 -0.37 -0.43 -0.25 -0.25 -0.16 0.22 0.98 0.02 0.27 
CAB 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.09 -0.04 -0.13 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.01 -0.14 0.03 0.21 0.18 0.05 0.96 -0.17 
INF -0.05 0.03 -0.04 -0.19 -0.29 -0.01 0.10 -0.13 -0.12 -0.05 0.01 -0.03 -0.10 -0.17 -0.20 -0.01 0.15 0.03 -0.09 0.21 -0.17 0.75 
E1 1.00 -0.04 -0.14                    
E2 -0.04 1.00 0.09                    
E3 -0.14 0.09 1.00                    
RESIDUALS                       
B-F-STAT COUNTRY 1.43 
(0.09) 
1.17 
(0.26) 
1.29 
(0.16) 
                   
B-F-STAT PERIOD 1.27 
(0.34) 
1.64 
(0.08) 
1.61 
(0.09) 
                   
UNIT ROOT-LEVEL -4.01 
(0.00) 
-6.85 
(0.00) 
-3.32 
(0.00) 
                   
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix between the instrumental variables, the regressors and the GMM residuals, as well as the cross correlations of the GMM residuals. The 
variables in the columns are the regressors, while the variables in the rows are the instruments, i.e. the first lag of the regressors. The values for the residuals are the cross-
correlations.  In the bottom panel, residual diagnostics, from the full sample (Total) estimation results presented in Table 1, consist of the Brown-Forsythe (1974) test for cross-
sectional and period heteroskedasticity and the Im et al. (1997) unit root test. The null hypotheses are variance equality and the existence of a unit root, respectively. 
 
 
